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Abstract 
 
In an endeavor to get the economy out of its economic slump the Japanese government has pro-
posed several structural reform measures, one of which involves the reduction in public invest-
ment spending. We study the soundness of this proposal by investigating both the correlation be-
tween public infrastructure and the private sector variables (private output, labour and capital) as 
well as the causal relationship between public infrastructure and the private variables. Public in-
frastructure comprises of physical (e.g., roads and ports) and social (e.g., academic in-
stitutes) infrastructure. For the first objective we employ the translog production function to 
determine the nature of the relationship between public infrastructure and the private variables. 
We find that total public infrastructure (physical plus social) has a positive and significant rela-
tionship with private output in the magnitude of 1.03%. Additionally not only do we find that all 
types of infrastructure impact positively on private sector output but also that social infrastructure 
had a greater impact on private sector output (0.58% higher).  Regarding the second objective we 
employ the Granger no-causality test procedure developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995).  We 
establish that public infrastructure Granger causes private labour and private capital. While pri-
vate capital and private labour Granger cause private output. Also there is a bi-causal relation-
ship between social public infrastructure and private capital. There exists reverse causality be-
tween public infrastructure and private output. As such public infrastructure affects private output 
indirectly through its impact on the private inputs.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
ublic infrastructure has been highlighted as a determinant of growth and it is argued that it has a pos-
itive effect on total output and productivity. Aschauer’s (1989) seminal paper provoked a vibrant 
debate on the importance of public infrastructure to growth and productivity. The paper argued that 
reductions in government spending in public infrastructure precipitated the decline in total factor productivity in the 
1970s in the United States.  There has been a barrage of research since then.  The results range from public infra-
structure being positive and significant Aschauer (1989), Mundell (1990) to public infrastructure being inconsequen-
tial to the growth process, Tatom (1991) and Hulten and Schwab (1991).  There is no universally held view among 
economists as to the true importance of public infrastructure.  There is tremendous controversy surrounding the em-
pirical results. Most of the work done in this area stems primarily from the United States.  Recently work has been 
emerging from Europe: Spain, Italy and Belgium. 
 
If public infrastructure can increase private sector growth and productivity, then growth can be accelerated 
or stimulated by increased spending on public infrastructure. Otherwise governments can focus on other areas, 
which promote growth. The objective of this paper is to verify the soundness of the Japanese 2001 proposal to cut 
spending on public investments by assessing the importance of public infrastructure to the Japanese economy.  The 
change of government in Japan in spring of 2001 brought with it a renewed vigor to get the economy out of its dec-
ade long economic slump. Among the various reform plans, the government proposed to resolve banks non-
performing loans and to reduce investments in public spending by ¥1 trillion a year. The proposed cuts are a central 
pillar of the structural reform of government finances. The Japanese current budget deficit is in the vicinity of 135%  
____________________ 
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of GDP.  It is expected that at present trends, the gross debt will rise more than 200% by the end of 2005 and 300% 
by 2011.  So there is no question that the government has to restructure its finances. What we have to question how-
ever is the nature of the reform package. One of the main criticisms of this proposal is that reductions in public in-
vestments together with the restructuring of the financial sector, would lead to higher levels of unemployment.  Ja-
pan’s unemployment   rate reached a record high of 5.8% in December of 2001.  Consequently we also explore the 
impact of reductions in public infrastructure spending on employment. 
 
It is common practice to use a parametric specification of the production function, such as Cobb-Douglas or 
translog specification, when production technology is analyzed.  In this paper we employ the translog production 
function specification to examine the correlation between public infrastructure and the private sector variables.  The 
translog production function unlike the Cobb-Douglas production function is a flexible functional form, which does 
not impose any a priori restrictions on the values of output elasticities, elasticities of substitution, returns to scale or 
technical change.  Establishing correlation however, says nothing about causality. Causal information would serve 
more useful in policy formulation since knowledge of cause and effect variables would render a more appropriate 
stimulus package.  In determining the nature of causality we utilize the Granger no-causality test procedure devel-
oped by Toda and Yamamoto (1995).   
 
The results are in favour of continued investments in all types of public infrastructure with perhaps a great-
er emphasis on social infrastructure for two reasons. Firstly increased social public infrastructure contributes more to 
private sector output than physical public infrastructure in the magnitude of 0.58%. Secondly social infrastructure 
has a bi-causal relationship with private capital, that is private capital investment stimulates and is stimulated by so-
cial public infrastructure. 
 
2.  Methodology 
 
2.1  The Translog Production Function 
 
We have assumed in this paper that the production technology in the economy takes the transcendental lo-
garithmic (translog) form as proposed by Christensen et al. (1973).  The translog function can be viewed as an ap-
proximation of second-order Taylor series of an arbitrary twice differentiable function. Hicks neutrality and symme-
try conditions (ij =ji) are imposed a priori.   The translog production function can be written as follows: 
 
lnY=0+L lnL+K lnK+GlnG + 1/2LL (ln L)
2 + 1/2KK (ln K)
2+ 1/2GG (lnG)
2 + LK lnL lnK+LG lnL lnG +KG lnK lnG     (1) 
 
where L is the total number of hours worked, K is private sector capital and G is the stock of public infrastructure
1
.  
 
This formulation is based on the assumption that the private sector maximizes profits (by using private cap-
ital and labour) given the stock of public infrastructure and the existing level of technology, which affects both la-
bour and private capital in the same manner (Hicks neutral). The stock of public infrastructure has the embryonic 
ability to increase the productive capacity of private capital and labour either through the expansion of existing re-
sources or by making more efficient use of resources.  We assume that public infrastructure is an unpaid fixed factor 
of production. This implies that the government finances its expenditure via taxation and provides services directly 
to the private sector at no cost. Economies of scale may result from the public provision of services.  Thus we fur-
ther assume that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale over the private inputs but increasing re-
turns over all inputs. This assumption is tested. 
 
This brings us to the behavior of the translog production function. In order for the translog production func-
tion to be well behaved it has to be homogeneous of degree one in private capital and labour.  This therefore implies 
the following: 
 
L + K =1,  LL+LK =0,  KK+LK =0,  KG + LG =0                     (2) 
 
 The homogeneity of degree one in capital and labour implies that the factor shares of capital and labour 
                                                 
1 See Appendix (A) for the components of public infrastructure. 
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sum to one: 
 
SL + SK =1                    (3) 
 
Thus given that the production function is homogeneous of degree one in capital and labour and based on 
the assumptions of Eq. (2)-(3) we arrive at the following system of equations: 
 
LnY-lnL=0+K(lnK-lnL)+(GlnG)+LK(lnLlnK-1/2(lnL)
2
-1/2(lnK)
2
)+KG(lnKlnG-lnLlnG) + 1/2GG lnG
2
          (4) 
 
 We are able to derive the various private income shares by differentiating the production function with re-
spect to the private inputs: 
 
SL=lnY/lnL= Y/L*L/Y = PLL/PYY =(1-K)+ LK(lnK-lnL)-KG lnG              (5) 
 
SK =lnY/lnK=Y/K*K/Y = PKK/PYY=K+LK (lnL-lnK)+KG lnG                             (6) 
 
 Similarly we can derive the shadow share for public infrastructure as: 
 
SG =lnY/lnG= Y/G*G/Y= ZGG/ PYY = G+ GG (lnK-lnL)+KG lnG                           (7) 
 
Where ZG is the shadow price of public infrastructure. 
 
Microeconomic theory requires that the estimated function must satisfy standard homogeneity, monotonici-
ty and concavity conditions. Homogeneity requires that Y(t,L,K,G,A) = tY(L,K,G,A)  t>0.   In the case of the pro-
duction frontier, monotonicity requires that the first-order derivative of output with respect to each input be non-
negative, that is: 
 
Y/Z =Sz Y/Z>0  where Z=L,K,G 
 
Since Y>0, and Y/Z >0, the test for monotonicity reduces to SZ>0. Thus monotonicity exists when SZ>0. Concavity 
requires that the Hessian matrix of second-order derivatives of output with respect to inputs be negative semi-
definite.  Violation of any of these properties casts doubt on the ability of the estimated frontier to represent the un-
derlying production technology.  We test for these later. 
 
2.2  Estimation Equation 
 
The first oil shock in 1973 had a fundamental impact on the Japanese economy and more specifically on 
the government’s fiscal policy.  Prior to 1973, the Japanese economy grew at an even rate, this changed after 1973. 
As such we tested for structural. The Wald test for the hypothesis that the given set of parameters is jointly zero was 
not accepted. The estimating equations therefore included a dummy and a time variable as a proxy for the structural 
change in the economy. The system then becomes: 
 
LnY-lnL=0+K(lnK-lnL)+(GlnG)+LK(lnLlnK-1/2(lnL)
2-1/2(lnK)2)+KG(lnKlnG-lnLlnG)+1/2GGlnG
2+KDd*t* 
(lnK-lnL)+(GDlnG)+LKDd*t*(lnLlnK-1/2(lnL)
2- 1/2(lnK)2)+KGDd*t*(lnKlnG-lnLlnG) + 1/2GGDd*t*lnG
2                            (8) 
 
SL=(1-K)+ LK(lnK-lnL)-KG lnG +LKDd*t*(lnK-lnL)-KGDd*t*lnG               (9) 
 
where d=0 for 1955-1973 and d=1 for 1974-1993.  t represents time as a proxy for technical change. 
 
A stochastic error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero expected value and with a 
positive definite symmetric covariance matrix, is added to Eq. (8) and (9). This system of equations is simultaneous-
ly estimated employing the three stage least squares (3SLQ) method. Further we determine the relative elasticities of 
conditional demand among the variables as follows: 
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XG = lnX/lnG= X/G*G/X=(XG + SXSG) Y/X
2
  X=L, K 
 
LK = lnL/lnK= L/K*K/L=(LK + SLSK) Y/L
2
 
 
This allows us to determine the relationship each variable has with the other variables in the production 
function. The bias of public infrastructure is determined via the sign of XG. Public infrastructure is factor saving if 
XG <0 (substitutes), it is factor using if XG >0 (complementary) and neutral if XG =0.  Similarly private labour and 
capital are complements if LK >0, substitutes if LK <0 and neutral if  LK= 0. 
 
2.3  Granger Causality 
 
The standard test for causality is the Granger causality test. The Granger test involves the following vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model:  
 
Gt = +
n
i=1 aiXt-i + 
n
j=1bjGt-j +  u1t                     (6) 
Xt = +
n
i=1 ciGt-i + 
n
j=1djXt-j+ u2t                  (7) 
 
where X= Y,L,K,   is a constant, and ut is the error term.  The first equation indicates that current G is related to its 
own past values as well as those of X.  Similarly, the second equation implies that current X is related to its own past 
values as well as those of G. With respect to causality, X is said to Granger cause G if using past values of X leads 
to a better prediction of the current value of G. Similarly G is said to Granger cause X if using past values of G leads 
to a better prediction of the current value of X.  
 
Unless the variables in levels are cointegrated the VAR Granger test will lead to spurious regression results, 
and the F-test is not valid. If variables within the vector autoregressive (VAR) model are not cointegrated, they are 
run in their first difference.  However if they are cointegrated, then the model can be written as an error correction 
model (ECM), where changes in variables depend on deviations from a long-term equilibrium that is defined by the 
cointegrating relationship as suggested by Engle and Granger (1987) and the vector auto-regression error-correction 
model (VECM) as suggested by Johansen and Jesulius, (1990). Unfortunately, these tests are cumbersome and sen-
sitive to the values of the nuisance parameters in finite samples and therefore their results are unreliable (Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995), Zapata and Rambaldi (1997)). Furthermore, pretests are necessary to determine the number of 
unit roots and the cointegrating ranks before proceeding to estimate a VECM.  
 
An optional method for testing for Granger causality has been proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995).  
This approach is applicable whether the VAR process is stationary, integrated (of an arbitrary order) or cointegrated 
(of an arbitrary order). There is no need to address the cointegration properties of the time series. The method in-
volves using a modified Wald test (MWald) for restrictions on the parameters of a VAR (k) (where k is the lag length 
in the system). Toda and Yamamoto showed that the test has an asymptotic 2 distribution when a VAR (k+dmax) is 
estimated where dmax is the maximum order of integration that occurs in the system. The test can be carried out 
without any information on the cointegration properties of the system and the test may be applied when no cointe-
gration exists and/or the stability and rank conditions are not satisfied.   All one needs to do is to determine the max-
imal order of integration dmax which we expect to occur in the model and construct a VAR in their levels with a total 
of p = (k + dmax) lags. Toda and Yamamoto point out that, for d=1, the lag selection procedure is always valid since 
k 1=d. If d=2, then the procedure is valid unless k=1. Moreover, according to Toda and Yamamoto, the MWald 
statistic is valid regardless.   
 
Estimation was undertaken using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method. Using the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method to independently estimate each equation would give consistent and unbiased estimates.  
Efficiency however can be improved if the SUR method is employed. 
 
2.4  Data 
 
 In this paper we employed the index number approach in estimation since we had items measured in hours 
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and in value. All the variables were converted into indices.   To ensure a consistent basis for estimation we opted for 
the use of the multilateral index
2
, which allows for more efficient results. The data used were obtained from various 
Japanese data sources. The primary sources of data were Japanese National Accounts, Historical Statistics of Japan 
1955-1985, Japan Statistical Yearbook 1986-1997, and Economic Statistics Annual 1967-1997.  See Appendix (B) 
for an elaboration of the sources and the method of calculation of the various items. 
 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1  The impact of Public Infrastructure on the Private Sector Variables: Translog Production Function 
 
The results of the impact of public infrastructure on private output are given in Table 1. There are four time 
periods, 1955-1993 (I) the entire period which does not account for structural change, 1955-1973 (II) the period 
prior the change, 1974-1993 (III) the period after the change and finally 1955-1993 (IV) which takes into account 
the structural change.  The regularity condition of convexity holds for all the time periods
3
.  Monotonicity however, 
does not hold for public infrastructure from around the early 1980s (1981-1982) in time periods (I)-(III).  In time pe-
riod (IV) monotonicity is not meet from the late 1980s (1986-1988). Regardless of the imposition of homogeneity 
restrictions and taking into account the structural changes in time period (IV), we have found that the monotonicity 
does not hold in the mid 1980s.  This means that private sector output is negatively affected by public infrastructure 
in these years.   
 
 
Table 1 The Impact of Public Infrastructure on Private Output 
       1955-1993 (I)         1955-1973 (II)       1974-1993 (III)       1955-1993 (IV) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic   Estimate t-statistic 
PPI     0.14    2.14     1.02     5.21      0.20     5.43     0.90     12.75  
SPI     1.08     13.0     2.45     3.91      0.21     5.32      1.48     12.35  
TPI     0.37     3.73      1.26     4.89      0.20     5.47      1.03     13.04  
AIES              1.55      9.15  
RDS               0.93     11.61 
PPI= Physical Public Infrastructure, SPI= Social Public Infrastructure, TPI= Total Public Infrastructure, AIES=Academic  
Institutes and the Education System, RDS= Roads 
 
 
From Table 1 we see the impact of physical (core) infrastructure (PPI) on private sector output.  In period 
(I) we find that a 1% increase in physical public infrastructure leads to a 0.14% increase in private sector output. In 
the period 1955-1973(II), physical public infrastructure has a substantial impact on private output, every 1% in-
crease in physical public infrastructure leads to a 1.02% increase in private sector output.  Clearly during this time 
period physical public infrastructure was a major contributor of growth in the Japanese economy.  In time period 
(III) physical public infrastructure is still a positive and significant factor for increasing private output.  However it 
is at a much lower level of 0.20%. Time period (IV) takes into account the change in the economy, which occurred 
after 1973. In this time period, we find that physical public infrastructure continues to be positive and significant. 
Physical public infrastructure increases output by 0.90%, the effect of the structural change is a reduction of the pos-
itive impact of physical public infrastructure in the magnitude of 0.012%
4
. 
 
With respect to social public infrastructure (SPI) we immediately notice that in all periods social public in-
frastructure like physical public infrastructure contributes significantly and positively to the growth of the private 
sector output.  However social public infrastructure does so at a higher rate, when compared with physical public in-
frastructure.  The pattern is similar to that of physical public infrastructure. In the first period when structural change 
                                                 
2 See Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) for discussion. 
3 The results of the tests for convexity and monotonicity are available upon request. So too are the goodness of fit tests. 
4 Obtained from the translog estimation. 
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is not accounted for, we find that social public infrastructure contributes 1.08% private sector output. Period II 
shows a significantly high contribution of social public infrastructure.  For every 1% increase in social public infra-
structure it leads to a 2.45% increase in private sector output.  Period (III) has a much lower contribution.  When 
structural change is accounted for, social public infrastructure contributes 1.48% to private sector output. The effect 
of the structural change is a reduction of the positive impact of social public infrastructure in the magnitude of 
0.022%. 
 
Total public infrastructure (TPI) is the combination of social and physical public infrastructure.  The result 
for period (I) is 0.37% this is in the vicinity of the Aschauer (1989) result of 0.39%.  However this result does not 
take into account the impact of the changes, which occurred in the Japanese economy after 1973.  When structural 
change is accounted for total public infrastructure contributes 1.03% to private sector output, the effect of the struc-
tural change is a reduction of the positive impact of total public infrastructure in the magnitude of 0.014%. 
 
AIES and RDS are the largest component of social and physical public infrastructure respectively.  As such 
we estimate separately these sub-categories to determine their impact on private sector output. In the case AIES, the 
regularity conditions of monotonicity and convexity are met over the whole period under consideration. Here we 
find that when structural change is accounted for, AIES contributes 1.55% to private sector output. The effect of the 
structural change is a reduction of the positive impact of AIES in the magnitude of 0.022%.   
 
The regularity condition of convexity holds for RDS, however monotonicity does not hold from 1986. We 
found that in time period (IV) RDS increases the private sector output by 0.93%.  From this we see clearly that AIES 
contributes significantly more to private sector output than RDS, thus emphasizing again the importance of social 
public infrastructure over physical public infrastructure. 
 
 
Table 2 Testing for Constant Returns to Scale 
     1955-1993 (I)       1955-73 (II)     1974-1993 (III)    1955-1993 (IV) 
      2 P-VALUE     2 P-VALUE     2 P-VALUE    2 P-VALUE 
PPI  72.26 *     0.00  37.42*     0.00  225.17*     0.00  3.30**     0.07  
SPI  6.45 *     0.01  57.12*     0.00  165.88*     0.00  44.60*     0.00 
TPI  24.84*     0.00  96.43*     0.00  205.69*     0.00 13.75*     0.00 
AIES        25.09*    0.00 
RDS              2.85 **    0.09  
  *2 (1) 5% = 3.84; **
2
 (1) 10% = 2.71 
 
 
Returns to scale gives us an indication of how the output increases with respect to inputs.  As seen in Table 
2, we cannot accept the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (CRTS) for all categories of public infrastructure.   
Based on the Wald test we reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (CRTS) for all categories of public 
infrastructure at the 5% and 10 % levels of significance respectively. We conclude then that there are CRTS to the 
private sector inputs (labour and capital) and increasing returns to scale (IRTS) over all inputs. 
 
So far we have found that social infrastructure increases private sector output more than physical infrastruc-
ture, however over the period 1955-1993, investments in physical infrastructure was significantly higher than in-
vestments in social infrastructure.  This is a salient factor to be considered in future policy formation. It is important 
to examine not only the elasticity of public infrastructure (the direct effect) with respect to its impact on the private 
sector.  It is equally important to determine the relationship between public infrastructure and the various private in-
puts (the indirect effect).   
 
Table 3 contains the various elasticities of conditional demand among the variables (L, K, G). The results 
reported here, are the overall (1955-1993) mean value of the respective elasticities. We see that the private inputs of 
capital and labour are complements in the production process. So too are all categories (and sub-categories) of pub-
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lic infrastructure and private capital. All categories (and sub-categories) of public infrastructure and private labour 
were complements until the late seventies, in the early eighties public infrastructure and private labour became subs-
titutes
5
.  The overall result however, is that private labour and all categories (and sub-categories with the exception 
of AIES) of public infrastructure are substitutes.  
 
 
 
It should be noted however, that AIES and labour were complements from 1955-1983. From 1984-1993 la-
bour and AIES have been substitutes. We can conclude then that there is a general substitutive relationship between 
public infrastructure and labour.  
 
Thus we find that when the stock of public infrastructure increases, the private sector demands less labour 
and more capital. This has serious implications for employment, since it suggests that increases in public infrastruc-
ture decrease the demand for labour. However given that private capital and labour are complements, this means that 
when the demand for private capital increases so to does the demand for private labour. So while public infrastruc-
ture reduces the demand for labour on one hand, through the relationship between private capital and private labour, 
the demand for private labour increases as public infrastructure increases.  Additionally the results here pertain only 
to private sector labour. Increases in public infrastructure spending may well increase the demand for government 
sector workers, leading to an overall increase in total employment. 
 
3.2  The Causal Nature of Public Infrastructure: Toda and Yamamoto (1995) Granger Causality Test 
 
Tables 4-6 contain the results for the Granger no-causality tests for the entire period 1955-1993 not ac-
counting for structural change. Causality is determined via the asymptotic 2 distribution with degree of freedom p 
(k+d). We present the results for two cases of VAR (p); VAR (3) (d=1 and k=2), and VAR (4) (d=2 and k=2).  
 
There are four possible patterns of causality which we may find: (1) uni-directional causality from public 
infrastructure to the private variables; (2) uni-directional causality from the private variables to public infrastructure 
(reverse causation); (3) a bi-directional causal relationship where the private variables cause public infrastructure 
and public infrastructure causes the private variables; (4) and finally there can be no causality. The nature of the 
causal relationship will have policy implications as to whether or not there should be reductions in investments in 
public infrastructure. 
 
Table 4 provides us with the results of the test of no causality between public infrastructure and the private 
sector variables. Ho: public infrastructure does not cause the various private sector variables. Columns 1,2 and 3 
contain the Wald test statistic with the corresponding p–value in parenthesis to determine whether public infrastruc-
ture causes private output, private capital and private labour respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 A similar result was found for the United States by Pereira and Flores (1999) 
Table 3 The Elasticities of Conditional Demand 
 TPI   PPI   SPI  
 
AIES      RDS   
Private 
Inputs 
  KG   LG     KG   LG    KG  LG   KG LG   KG LG LK KL 
 Mean  1.31  (0.14)   1.20  (0.16)   1.65  (0.04) 
 
1.72  0.12  
 
1.22  
 
(0.18) 
  
  0.81  
  
1.51  
 Std. Dev  1.68  0.27    1.54  0.25    2.10  0.28  
  
2.16  0.19  
  
1.57  
    
0.25  
    
 0.40  
    
1.70  
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TABLE 4 Granger Causality Test 
Wald test 1955-1993 
         VAR (3)  
GY,L,K 1 2 3 
Dependent variable LY LK LL 
LG1 2.2 (0.14) 1106.2 (0.00) 1810.0 (0.00) 
LG2 0.76 (0.38) 932.0 (0.00) 1256.0 (0.00) 
LG3 8.2 (0.00) 1847.2 (0.00) 926.0 (0.00) 
LAIES 14.2 (0.00) 2063.0 (0.00) 576.0 (0.00) 
LRDS 0.149 (0.97) 684.5 (0.00) 873.0 (0.00) 
  
 
       VAR (4)  
LG1 7.87 (0.00) 920.9 (0.00) 1441.0 (0.00) 
LG2 4.66 (0.03) 743.6 (0.00) 911.8 (0.00) 
LG3 1.28 (0.26) 1461.7 (0.00) 821.2 (0.00) 
LAIES 2.28 (0.13) 1521.6 (0.00) 569.0 (0.00) 
LRDS 1.30 (0.25) 455.2 (0.00) 601.0 (0.00) 
    
LG1=ln (TPI); LG2=ln (PPI); LG3=ln(SPI); LAIES=ln (AIES); 
LRDS= ln(RDS); LY=ln(Y); LK=ln(K); LL=ln(L) 
 
 
We first examine whether public infrastructure causes private sector output.  For VAR (3) at all levels of 
significance (1%, 5%, 10%), the null hypothesis of no causality is accepted with the exception of social infrastruc-
ture and its subcomponent AIES. For social infrastructure and its subcomponent AIES we reject the null hypothesis 
and conclude that they Granger cause private output. In the case of VAR (4) we again accept the null hypothesis of 
no causality however, here the exception is total public infrastructure. At all levels of significance we cannot accept 
the null hypothesis of no causality for total public infrastructure. We conclude that total infrastructure Granger caus-
es private sector output. The direction of causality vis-à-vis public infrastructure and private output is sensitive to 
the lag length employed in the analysis. Unless an appropriate lag length is stipulated we cannot make any precise 
conclusion based on these contradicting results. 
 
The results for the private inputs labour and capital (columns 2 and 3) are the same regardless of the lag 
length (VAR (3), VAR (4)) and the level of significance (1%, 5% 10%). We reject the null hypothesis of no causali-
ty between public infrastructure and the private inputs and conclude that public infrastructure (all categories and 
sub-categories) Granger cause the private inputs, labour and capital. These results are not sensitive to the lag length 
as such we can positively construe that all categories of public infrastructure Granger cause the private inputs. 
 
In Table 5 we examine the results of Ho: the private sector variables do not cause public infrastructure.  
Here the test is for reverse causation. Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 contain the respective Wald test statistic with the cor-
responding p–value in parenthesis.  It is important to recognize at the out set that the results presented in Table 5, are 
insensitive to the lag length, this ensures consistency of the results for both VAR (3) and VAR (4). 
 
So we find that regardless of the lag length and the level of significance, private output Granger causes all 
categories and sub-categories of public infrastructure.  In the case of private capital, we cannot reject the null hypo-
thesis of no Granger causality between private capital and public infrastructure for both VAR (3) and VAR (4).  
Once again, the exception is social infrastructure and its subcomponent AIES. At all levels of significance we reject 
the null hypothesis that social infrastructure and its subcomponent AIES do not Granger cause public infrastructure.   
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Table 5 Granger Causality Test  –Wald Test 1955-1993 
        VAR (3)    
Y,L,KG 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable LG1 LG2 LG3 LAIES LRDS 
LY 75.6 (0.00) 68.8 (0.00) 312.2 (0.00) 685.4 (0.00) 141.4 (0.00) 
LK 20.8 (0.15) 1.38 (0.24) 8.77 (0.00) 10.36 (0.00) 6.92 (0.01) 
LL 2.42 (0.12) 3.30 (0.07) 1.85 (0.17) 2.50 (0.12) 5.35 (0.02) 
      
        VAR (4)    
 LG1 LG2 LG3 LAIES LRDS 
LY 59.3 (0.00) 61.2 (0.00) 182.1 (0.00) 348.4 (0.00) 150.1 (0.00) 
LK 3.04 (0.08) 1.67 (0.20) 10.8 (0.00) 13.1 (0.00) 5.35 (0.02) 
LL 3.43 (0.06) 3.23 (0.07) 1.87 (0.17) 2.95 (0.09) 3.93 (0.05) 
 
 
With respect to labour we again establish that regardless of the lag length and the level of significance we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality between private labour and public infrastructure. There is 
no evidence of a bi-causal relationship between labour and public infrastructure.  Causality is uni-directional and it 
runs from public infrastructure to private labour. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the examination of the causal relationship between the various private sector 
variables.  We verify that there is only uni-directional causality from the private sector inputs of labour and capital 
to private sector output, regardless of the lag length and the level of significance. Private sector inputs precede pri-
vate output. This implies that anything, which increases private sector inputs, would by extension lead to increases 
in private output. 
 
 
Table 6 Granger Causality Test 
Wald Test 1955-1993 
      VAR (3)       VAR(4) 
K,L Y 1 2 
Dependent Variable LY LY 
LK 431.9 (0.00) 348.7 (0.00) 
LL 169.2 (0.00) 139.8 (0.00) 
   
Y K,L   
Dependent Variable LK LL 
VAR (3)   
LY 0.93 (0.33) 0.208 (0.65) 
   
VAR (4)   
LY 0.53 (0.47) 0.015 (0.90) 
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Based on the results of Tables 4 and 5 we can corroborate the robustness of the relationship between the 
private inputs and public infrastructure. The pattern of causality remained constant as the VAR lags changed.   We 
have found that there is uni-directional causality between private labour and public infrastructure, where public in-
frastructure Granger causes private labour. In the case of private capital there exists a uni-directional relationship 
with physical infrastructure and its component RDS. That is physical infrastructure and its component RDS Granger 
causes private capital and not vice versa. With respect to private capital and social infrastructure and its component 
AIES, we found bi-directional causality for both VAR (3) and VAR (4). 
 
As recognized earlier the results regarding the causal relationship between public infrastructure and private 
output are sensitive to the lag length employed. As such it is essential to identify the appropriate lag length to allow 
a decisive conclusion. We thus tested the variables for the order of integration and found that the maximum lag 
length to be 2 and that the maximum order of integration of the variables is 1 (based on the unit roots tests). As such 
we refer to the results of VAR (3).  In this regard at all levels of significance we conclude that there exists bi-
directional causality between social infrastructure and its subcomponent AIES and private output. With respect to 
the physical infrastructure category and its subcomponent RDS, there exists uni-directional reverse causation i.e. 
private output Granger causes physical infrastructure and not vice versa. We now deliberate the impact that structur-
al change would have on these results. 
 
3.3  The impact of structural change 
 
As noted from the Wald test in the translog section, the Japanese economy experienced structural changed 
after the first oil crisis.  Consequently we tested the period before and after 1973 to determine the impact of structur-
al change on the causal relationship between the private variables and public infrastructure.  We did not conduct 
causality tests for the whole period, 1955-1993, taking into accounting structural change, since we find that doing 
would not clearly indicate the true nature of causality that existed before 1973.  Robustness of the results is ensured 
if consistency in is achieved in both time periods. The causality results for the period before and after the oil shock 
are presented in Tables 7-12.  For the reasons given above we discuss only the VAR (3) results. 
 
According to Table 7, during the period 1955-1973, none of the categories of public infrastructure Granger 
caused private sector output.  The same holds for the period 1974-1993, we see from Table 8 that no type of public 
infrastructure Granger causes private output. This does not compare with the results for the entire period. If we con-
sider that accounting for structural change facilitates a more realistic analysis of the economy then we can conclude 
that public infrastructure does not Grange cause private output at all levels of significance. 
 
In both time periods all categories of public infrastructure Granger cause the private inputs. This can be 
seen in columns 2 and 3 of Tables 7-8.  This result is consistent with the results for the entire period. We can safely 
conclude then that variations in investments in public infrastructure will have a direct impact on the utilization of 
private inputs by firms. Structural change did not alter the causal relationship between public infrastructure and the 
private inputs. 
 
 
Table 7 Granger Causality Test -Wald test 1955-1973 
         VAR (3)  
GY,L,K 1 2 3 
Dependent variable LY LK LL 
LG1 0.84(0.36) 63.60(0.00) 202.4(0.00) 
LG2 0.13(0.72) 113.0(0.00) 156.7(0.00) 
LG3 3.71(0.05) 193.2(0.00) 354.0(0.00) 
LAIES 4.24 (0.04) 534.4(0.00) 310.0(0.00) 
LRDS 0.24(0.88) 185.4(0.00) 116.0(0.00) 
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Table 8 Granger Causality Test -Wald test  1974-1993 
         VAR (3)  
GY,L,K 1 2 3 
Dependent variable LY LK LL 
LG1 2.41(0.12) 150.0(0.00) 72.1(0.00) 
LG2 4.68(0.03) 174.0(0.00) 38.8(0.00) 
LG3 0.38(0.98) 89.0(0.00) 143(0.00) 
LAIES 0.85(0.77) 100.0(0.0) 119(0.00) 
LRDS 3.36(0.07) 93.00(00) 41.8(0.00) 
    
 
 
The test for reverse causation is presented in Tables 9-10. In Table 9 we find that prior to the oil shock, pri-
vate sector output Granger caused all categories of public infrastructure. With respect to capital there existed a bi-
directional causal relationship between private capital and social infrastructure. In the case of labour there existed bi-
directional causality between labour and all categories of infrastructure with the exception of AIES.  The labour re-
sults differ significantly from the 1955-1993 period.   
 
 
Table 9 Granger Causality Test  –Wald Test 1955-1973 
        VAR (3)    
Y,L,KG 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable LG1 LG2 LG3 LAIES LRDS 
LY 10.86(0.00) 8.40(0.00) 47.47(0.00) 74.0(0.00) 20.12(0.00) 
LK 1.53(0.22) 1.07(0.30) 14.65(0.00) 0.93(0.33) 2.39(0.12) 
LL 14.75 (0.00) 14.80(0.00) 8.95(0.00) 6.16(0.13) 16.88(0.00) 
      
 
 
Table 10 Granger Causality Test  –Wald Test 1974-1993 
Y,L,KG        VAR (3)    
 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent variable LG1 LG2 LG3 LAIES LRDS 
LY 16.87(0.00) 10.82(0.00) 47.13(0.00) 83.16(0.00) 25.0(0.00) 
LK 5.69(0.02) 5.43(0.02) 6.59(0.01) 6.32(0.01) 1.32(0.25) 
LL 0.05(0.83) 0.102(0.75) 0.15(0.70) 0.16(0.69) 0.018(0.89) 
      
 
 
In Table 10, for the period 1974-1993, causality again runs from private sector output to all categories of 
public infrastructure. In this period there exists a bi-directional relationship between private capital and social infra-
structure and its sub component AIES. Labour does not cause any type of public infrastructure.  In this latter period 
Journal Of Business And Economics Research                                                                           Volume 1, Number 3 
 12 
1974-1993 the results are the same as the total period 1955-1993 in Table 5.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables 11-12 take into account the causal relationship between the private sector variables over the period 
1955-1973 and 1974-1993 respectively.  In both Tables private capital and labour Granger cause private output. 
There is only uni-directional causality from the private variables to private output. This result is consistent with the 
result of the overall period. As in the case of public infrastructure and the private inputs, structural change did not al-
ter the causal relationship between private output and the private inputs. 
 
The relationship between public infrastructure and the private inputs (labour and capital) remain generally 
consistent in spite of the structural change and lag length considered.  However the direct relationship between pri-
vate output and public infrastructure changes with the lags and when structural change is taken into account. When 
we take into account the impact of structural change in the economy, we conclude that private output uni-
directionally causes public infrastructure.  The existence of reverse causation does not imply that public infrastruc-
ture has no impact on private output, since all categories of public infrastructure Granger cause the private inputs. 
Table 11 Granger Causality Test 
Wald Test 1955-1973 
       VAR (3)  
K,L Y 1  
Dependent Variable LY  
LK 33.6(0.00)  
LL 28.9(0.00)  
Y K,L   
Dependent Variable   
VAR (3)  LK  
LY   
VAR (4) 4.94(0.03)  
LY 0.02(0.89)  
Table 12 Granger Causality Test 1974-1993 
       VAR (3)  
K,L Y 1  
Dependent Variable LY  
LK 100.8(0.00)  
LL 12.39(0.00)  
Y K,L   
Dependent Variable LK  
VAR (3)   
LY 0.79(0.37)  
VAR (4)   
LY 0.57(0.45)  
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 The private inputs in turn Granger cause private output, and it is through this relationship that public infra-
structure influences private output. More importantly it has a direct impact on the level of employment and private 
capital accumulation. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we employed the translog production function to determine the relationship between public in-
frastructure and the various private sector variables from 1955-1993.  We found a positive and significant relation-
ship between private sector output and all categories and sub-categories of public infrastructure.  Additionally, not 
only do we find that all types of public infrastructure positively affect private sector output, but also that social in-
frastructure has a greater impact on private sector output when compared with physical infrastructure.  This is con-
trary to the view that physical infrastructure is more important for stimulating growth in the private sector. 
 
The results found here differ in both in terms of the size and type of infrastructure.  Firstly few papers have 
found such a high elasticity for public infrastructure and secondly most papers have found that physical infrastruc-
ture is more important for the growth process. Here we have found that while physical infrastructure is important for 
the growth process, social infrastructure is even more important in Japan.  
 
We have also established that public infrastructure and private capital were complements over the period 
considered.   However public infrastructure and private labour have an overall substitutive relationship, this implies 
that increases in public infrastructure spending leads to higher levels of private unemployment. There are two points 
to note here first that this does not mean that total unemployment would increase, since it is expected that increases 
in public investments in infrastructure would increase the demand for public workers as such we may expect that as 
public infrastructure increases, total employment would also increase.  Secondly the complementary relationship be-
tween private capital and public infrastructure, and private capital and private labour, lead to an indirect increase in 
the demand for private labour when public infrastructure increases.  
 
Additionally we investigated the nature of the causal relationship between public infrastructure and the var-
ious private inputs using the Granger no-causality test procedure developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). We 
again investigated the period 1955-1993.  Additionally we examined the impact of structural change, which occurred 
in 1973, the period of the first oil crisis. The findings of the paper support the need for continued public infrastruc-
ture spending, since we found that all categories of public infrastructure cause private labour and private capital. 
Robustness of the results is ensured as they are consistent regardless of the lag length and the period considered. We 
verified that the private inputs uni-directionally caused private output and we found that private output uni-
directionally caused public infrastructure.  Increases in public infrastructure then have direct implications for em-
ployment and private investments and indirect implications for private output.  
 
Private capital and social public infrastructure and its sub-component AIES have a bi-directional causal re-
lationship. AIES comprises namely academic institutes and the school system. This implies that funding for research 
and development as well as improving the school system would result in greater efficiency for the private sector. 
This highlights the importance of human capital development in Japan. 
 
 Japan's educational system has been unbeaten at turning out the workers its industry has needed in the past. 
But now it is widely regarded as being in trouble, since it needs to reform to develop graduates who can innovate, 
not just conform. Recently there has been growing criticism that schools are not providing the human resources ne-
cessary for economic growth. In a way, education is taking the flak for the protracted economic slump. The need for 
bold educational reform is obvious. “Without educational reform, we will not be able to generate new economic 
growth,” says Kokei Higuchi, vice president of the Japan Business Federation6. The results found here would be in 
favour of educational reform since we have found that AIES has a significant impact on private sector output. 
 
 If we recognize that academic institutes incorporates not only universities but also government research in-
                                                 
6 Taken from Asahi 08/08/02 
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stitutes then we can make the connection between AIES and private capital. The objective of academic institutes is 
namely research and development (R&D). R&D implies improvements and innovations, which are usually applied 
to the private sector. This translates into investment in new technology for the private sector. R&D expenditures by 
all major Japanese industry sectors have been at best level and have been decreasing repeatedly since the early 
1990s (National Science Foundation NSF (1995)). It should be noted, however, that while Japan's ratio of R&D to 
GDP is the highest in the world, its ratio of government funded R&D is lowest in the developed countries (Hayashi-
da 1996). There is therefore room for improvement in AIES funding. 
 
 Overall then we see that there is indeed a role for public infrastructure investment in Japan more specifical-
ly, there is a great role for social infrastructure. We have found that public infrastructure can serve as a catalyst for 
growth.   Actual evidence however has shown that public infrastructure has not helped to spur growth in the Japa-
nese economy. The catalytic nature of public infrastructure may have been inhibited due to sub-optimal allocation, 
mismanagement of public funds and inefficiency in the use of public infrastructure. These are all issues, which re-
quire further investigation.  Notwithstanding these possible limitations, based on the results found here, the policy 
recommendation would be to continue investments in all types of public infrastructure with greater emphasis on so-
cial infrastructure namely AIES.    
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Appendix 
 
(A) Defining Public Infrastructure 
 
Physical (Core) Infrastructure (PPI): Ports, Roads (RDS), Subway, Airports, Postal Service, Sewage System, All 
Waste Water System, Industrial Water system 
 
Social (Environmental/Other) Infrastructure (SPI): City Parks, Academic Institute and School System 
(AIES), Education and Sports, Afforestation, Seashore Development 
 
Total Public Infrastructure (TPI): PPI + SPI 
 
 
(B) Data Elaboration 
 
Private Sector Output: (The pivate sector output was determined via the OECD formula for calculating Private 
GDP as given in their Business Sector Data Base, here it is determine via the expenditure side) Gross Domestic Ex-
penditure Less Government Final Consumption Less Gross fixed capital by the Public Sector Less Increase in stock 
by public enterprises Equals Private sector GDE=GDP 
 
Private Labour/Employment Total Employment Less Government Employees (National and Local Government) 
Equals Private sector labour 
 
Labour hours Worked was calculated as: Private labour x Average Hours worked (monthly) x 12; 
 
Private Sector Capital Economic Planning Agency (EPA) 
 
Public Infrastructure Toyoeizai Shinposha (1998)   
 
All Other Variables 
 
Variable  Calculation 
GDP Deflator GDPDEF  
PCF Deflator PCFDEF  
Real Gross Private Capital Stock RPK  
Private Fixed Capital Consumption PFCC  
Average Interest Rate on loans and discounts IR IR 
Corporate (Basic) Income Tax Rate CTR CTR 
Private Fixed Capital Consumption PFCC  
Depreciation Rate for private capital DEPPK (PFCC/GDPDEF)/RPK  (mean value 0.086582) 
Unit User cost of capital UPK ((PCFDEF/GDPDEF)*(IR+DEPPK)/1-CTR 
Depreciation Rate for public infrastructure DEPPI 0.0792
*
 
 
*Calculation based on Nemoto et al. (1999).  The depreciation rate of public infrastructure would be smaller than 
that of the depreciation of private capital since public infrastructure is more durable than the privately owned capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal Of Business And Economics Research                                                                           Volume 1, Number 3 
 16 
 
Notes 
 
